Previous analyses of the implementation of in ‡ation targeting are extended to monetary policy responses to di¤erent shocks, consequences of model uncertainty, and e¤ects of interest rate smoothing and stabilization. Model uncertainty, output stabilization, and interest rate stabilization or smoothing all call for a more gradual adjustment of the conditional in ‡ation forecast toward the in ‡ation target. The conditional in ‡ation forecast is the natural intermediate target during in ‡ation targeting. The optimal way of reacting to shocks is hence to check how they a¤ect the in ‡ation forecast and then take the appropriate action.
I. Introduction
Explicit in ‡ation targeting has been subject to considerable attention during the last few years. New Zealand, Canada, UK, Sweden, Finland, Australia and Spain have monetary policy regimes with explicit in ‡ation targets. Two recent conference volumes, Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Haldane (1995) , and an increasing number of research papers, deal with di¤erent aspects of in ‡ation targeting. At a recent symposium (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1996) ), the four major papers (by Stanley Fischer, Charles Freedman, Mervyn King and John Taylor) recommended explicit in ‡ation targeting as the best way of achieving and maintaining low and stable in ‡ation. 1 In Svensson (1997a) , I examined both the implementation and the monitoring of in ‡ation targeting. In a simple closed-economy model, I showed that in ‡ation targeting implies that the central bank's conditional in ‡ation forecast for a horizon corresponding to the control lag becomes an intermediate target (in line with explicit statements in King (1994) and Bowen (1995) ). Under what we can call strict in ‡ation targeting, with low and stable in ‡ation being the only goal for monetary policy (a zero weight on output stabilization), this implies that the central bank should adjust its instrument such that the conditional in ‡ation forecast for the control lag equals the in ‡ation target. Under what we may call ‡exible in ‡ation targeting (with a positive weight on output stabilization), the conditional in ‡ation forecast should instead be adjusted gradually towards the in ‡ation target. I also argued that in ‡ation targeting allows e¢cient monitoring of monetary policy by the public, especially if the central bank makes the conditional in ‡ation forecast an explicit intermediate target, and publishes and allows public scrutiny of its in ‡ation forecast, including models, analyses and judgements. The conditional in ‡ation forecast then becomes an ideal intermediate target in that it is the current variable most 1 See Svensson (1997a) , for instance, for further references to the literature on in ‡ation targeting. correlated with the goal, is easier to control than the goal, is easier to observe than the goal, and by implying extremely transparent principles for monetary policy is most conducive to public understanding of monetary policy. I also showed that in ‡ation targeting is more e¢cient than money growth or exchange rate targeting, in the sense of bringing lower in ‡ation variability.
In the present paper, I extend the analysis of the implementation of in ‡ation targeting to the monetary policy response to di¤erent shocks (section III), to the consequences of model uncertainty (section IV), and to the e¤ects of interest rate smoothing and stabilization (section V). Section II restates the result that in ‡ation targeting implies that the conditional in ‡ation forecast becomes an intermediate target, and shows how that intermediate target is a¤ected by a positive weight on output-gap stabilization. This section goes beyond Svensson (1997a) in incorporating a stochastic "natural rate" level of output and exogenous variables. Section VI concludes. Appendix A contains some technical details.
II. In ‡ation forecast targeting
This section shows that conditional in ‡ation targeting implies that the conditional in ‡ation forecast for a horizon corresponding to the control lag becomes an intermediate target. Although the result can be demonstrated in a much more elaborate model with a more explicit role for agents' expectations, a much simpler model is su¢cient. 2 The model nevertheless has some structural similarity to more elaborate models used by certain central banks. Svensson (1998b) discusses some issues that arise with a more forward-looking model in an open economy.
The important aspects of the model are that the monetary authority has imperfect control over in ‡ation, that in ‡ation and the output gap react with a lag to changes in the monetary policy 2 For instance, it is not necessary to assume the systematic discretionary in ‡ation bias (due to 'time-consistency' problems) emphasized in the modern 'principal-agent' approach to central banking (for instance in the work by Barro and Gordon (1983) , Rogo¤ (1985) , Walsh (1995) , Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Svensson (1997b) ) and disputed in the 'traditional' approach (for instance in McCallum (1995) and Romer and Romer (1996) ); see Tabellini (1995) for discussion of these approaches.
instrument, that in ‡ation reacts with a longer lag than the output gap, and that a stochastic persistent "natural (rate)" level of output and some exogenous variables (like oil prices) also are of importance. Consider the following model with an accelerationist Phillips curve and an aggregate demand equation,
(1)
where
is the in ‡ation (rate) in year t, p t is the (log) price level, y t is the output gap (the log of the ratio of output to the natural output level), x t is an exogenous variable, i t is the monetary policy instrument or operating target (for instance, a short repo rate or the federal funds rate), ¼ t+1jt denotes E t ¼ t+1 (the in ‡ation in year t + 1 expected in year t), and " t , t and µ t are iid shocks in year t which are not known in year t ¡ 1. The coe¢cients ® y ,~y and r are assumed to be positive;°ful…lls 0 ·°· 1.
In this annual discrete-time model, the instrument i t can be interpreted as a short interest rate held constant by the monetary authority from one year to the next. Then i t can be interpreted as a one-year interest rate controlled by the monetary authority, and i t ¡ ¼ t+1jt as a real one-year interest rate.
The change in in ‡ation is increasing in the lagged output gap. The output gap is serially correlated and decreasing in the lagged real interest rate, i t ¡ ¼ t+1jt . The real interest rate a¤ects the output gap with a one-year lag, and hence in ‡ation with a two-year lag, that is, the control lag for in ‡ation in the model. That the instrument a¤ects in ‡ation with a longer lag than the output gap is consistent with results from a number of VAR-studies. The average output gap, E[y t ], is zero, and the average real interest rate, E[i t ¡ ¼ t+1jt ], is normalized to zero. As clari…ed in appendix A, the exogenous variable x t can be interpreted (when°> 0)
as a persistent disturbance to the natural level of output (in which case´t +1 is the di¤erence between a temporary demand shock and a shock to the natural output level), or a persistent disturbance to aggregate demand.
In ‡ation expectations ¼ t+1jt in year t are by (1) predetermined and ful…ll
Using (4) in (2) results in the reduced form aggregate demand equation
where¯y =~y + ® y¯r ;
and i t ¡ ¼ t may be called a "pseudo-real" repo rate. Thus, the model can be represented by (1),
and (3).
Interpret in ‡ation targeting as monetary policy conducted by a monetary authority with a long-run in ‡ation target ¼ ¤ (say 2 percent per year) but with no long-run output-gap target (other than the long-run average, zero). Furthermore, in the short-run, the monetary authority wants to reduce in ‡ation ‡uctuations around the long-run in ‡ation target, and output-gap ‡uc-tuations around zero. 3 This can be formalized as the monetary authority's intertemporal loss function being
where E t denotes expectations conditional upon information available in year t, the discount factor ± ful…lls 0 < ± < 1, and the period loss function L(
where¸¸0 is the weight on output-gap stabilization. That is, the monetary authority wishes to minimize the expected sum of discounted squared future deviations of in ‡ation and output from the in ‡ation target and the natural output level, respectively. 4 5 Svensson (1997a) shows that the …rst-order condition for minimizing (6) over the repo rate can be written
Here ¼ t+2jt (i t ) denotes the "two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast", E [¼ t+2 ji t ; ¼ t ; y t ; x t ], the forecast for annual in ‡ation from year t + 1 to year t + 2, conditional upon a given instrument level i t , and conditional upon the predetermined state variables in year t (¼ t , y t and x t ). It is given by
where a y = ® y (1 +¯y); a x = ® y¯x and a r = ® y¯r :
The one-year in ‡ation forecast, ¼ t+1jt , is predetermined and given by (4). The coe¢cient c(¸)
is a function of the relative weight¸given by
and ful…lls 0 · c(¸) < 1, and the coe¢cient k(¸) is another function of¸given by
Under strict in ‡ation targeting, when the weight on output-gap stabilization is zero (¸= 0) and only in ‡ation enters in the loss function, the coe¢cients ful…ll c(0) = 0 and k(0) = 1. Then 4 Since the central bank does not have perfect control over in ‡ation, it is not meaningful to minimize the realized squared deviations, only the expected squared deviations (conditional upon the information available when the repo rate is set). 5 Since there is an asymmetry between in ‡ation and output in that there is a level target subject to choice only for the former, I …nd it appropriate to refer to this as "( ‡exible) in ‡ation targeting" rather than "in ‡ation-and-output-gap-targeting" (at least as long as the relative weight¸is not excessive), especially since the former name is already used for the monetary policy regimes in New Zealand, Canada, U.K., Sweden and Australia. the …rst-order condition simpli…es to
The monetary authority should adjust its instrument such that the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast always equals the in ‡ation target.
Under ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, when there is a positive weight on output-gap stabilization (¸> 0) and both in ‡ation and the output gap enter the loss function, the interpretation of the …rst-order condition (8) is still intuitive. The monetary authority should adjust the instrument such that the deviation of the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast from the long-run in ‡ation target is a fraction c(¸) of the deviation of the pre-determined one-year in ‡ation forecast from the in ‡ation target. Instead of always adjusting the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast all the way to the long-run in ‡ation target, the monetary authority should adjust the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast gradually towards the long-run in ‡ation target. The intuition is that this reduces output-gap ‡uctuations, which is apparent from (1). The higher the weight on output-gap stabilization, the slower the adjustment of the conditional in ‡ation forecast towards the long-run in ‡ation target (the larger the coe¢cient c(¸), see Svensson (1997a) ). The righthand side of (8) can hence be interpreted as a variable short-run target for the two-year in ‡ation forecast.
In general, (8) and its variant (13) imply that the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast, that is, the conditional in ‡ation forecast corresponding to the control lag, can be interpreted as an explicit intermediate target. As in Svensson (1997a) , I call (8) and its variant (13) (8) or (13), the repo rate should be increased (decreased). This results in an endogenous reaction function, an instrument rule, expressing the instrument as a function of current information.
Thus, substitution of the forecasts (4) and (9) into (8) leads to the optimal reaction function
The reaction function (14) is of the same form as the Taylor rule (1993 Taylor rule ( , 1996 , except that it also depends on the exogenous variable. The pseudo-real repo rate i t ¡ ¼ t is increasing in the excess of current in ‡ation over the in ‡ation target and in the current output gap. The instrument depends on current variables, not because current variables are targeted (they are predetermined) but because they predict future variables. Even if the weight on output-gap stabilization is zero, so that only future in ‡ation is targeted, the instrument will depend on all current variables that help predict future in ‡ation. 6 Actual in ‡ation in year t + 2 will unavoidably deviate from the in ‡ation target and the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast by a forecast error,
due to disturbances that occur within the control lag, after the monetary authority has set the instrument. Here ¼ t+2jt denotes the two-year in ‡ation forecast (9) conditional upon the reaction function (14),
From (8) and (4) the two-year in ‡ation forecast will follow
From (5), (14) and (15), the output gap will follow
To generalize from this model, in ‡ation targeting implies that the conditional in ‡ation forecast for a horizon corresponding to the control lag (two years in the model) becomes an intermediate target. Under strict in ‡ation targeting (no weight on output-gap stabilization), the instrument should be set so as to make the conditional in ‡ation forecast equal to the in‡ation target. Under ‡exible in ‡ation targeting (some weight on output-gap stabilization), the instrument should be set so as to make the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast approach the long-run in ‡ation target gradually. This behavior results in the optimal reaction function of the monetary authority. Since the conditional in ‡ation forecast depends on all relevant information, the instrument will be a function of this information.
III. Response to shocks
How should monetary policy react to shocks? 7 The conventional wisdom is that monetary policy should neutralize aggregate demand shocks, since these move in ‡ation and the output gap in the same direction. With regard to supply shocks, the conventional wisdom is that the response depends on the weight on output-gap stabilization. With a positive weight, it is optimal to partially accommodate supply shocks, since they a¤ect in ‡ation and the output gap in opposite directions. With a zero weight, the supply shock e¤ect on in ‡ation is neutralized, even though this enhances the e¤ect on the output gap.
When lags are taken into account, the conventional wisdom must be modi…ed. First, the monetary authority cannot a¤ect the …rst-round e¤ects on in ‡ation and the output gap of supply and demand shocks, due to the lags. It can only mitigate the second-round e¤ects.
Second, the reaction to temporary demand and supply shocks appears more symmetric. Third, the reaction to both shocks di¤ers with the weight on output-gap stabilization. Under strict in ‡ation targeting (with a zero weight on output-gap stabilization), the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is brought in line with the long-run in ‡ation target, regardless of how the shocks have a¤ected the one-year in ‡ation forecast. Hence, shocks must not let the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast deviate from the long-run target. Under ‡exible in ‡ation targeting (with a positive weight on output-gap stabilization), the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is adjusted less in response to the shocks. The e¤ect of these shocks on future in ‡ation is only gradually eliminated.
A general and operational way of determining the appropriate response to the shocks is to "…lter the shocks through the conditional in ‡ation forecast, and then take appropriate action."
More speci…cally, the e¤ects of the shocks on the one-year and two-year in ‡ation forecasts are assessed, and then the instrument is adjusted so that the …rst-order condition (8) still holds.
In order to see this, consider shocks in year t. By (4) these shocks will change the one-year in ‡ation forecast by
where I use the more elaborate model in appendix A in which the shock to the output gap,
consists of the di¤erence between a temporary demand shock,~t; and a shock to the natural output level, » t . By the analogy of (9) in appendix A, (A9), the shocks will change the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast by
where z t is a persistent demand disturbance, ³ t is a shock to this demand disturbance, y n t is (the log of) the natural output level, and the coe¢cients a r , a y , a z and a n are given by (A10)-(A13).
The term within brackets in (18) is the change in the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast due to the shocks, and the other term is the change due to the change in the instrument, i t ¡ i tjt¡1 .
The changes in the one-year and two-year in ‡ation forecasts must obey the …rst-order condition (8), which implies that they must ful…ll
Thus, (17)-(19) determine the required change in the instrument.
Solving for the instrument change results in
where I have used (A5)-(A6) and (A10)-(A13), and°n (0 ·°n · 1) is the degree of persistence of the natural output level (for°n = 1 the natural output level is a random walk). The numerator in (20) is the change in the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast caused by the shocks, less the fraction c(¸) of the change in the one-year in ‡ation forecast due to the shock. The denominator is the policy multiplier of the instrument for the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast.
We see that the response to the shocks vary with the relative weight on output-gap stabilization,¸, via the e¤ect on the coe¢cient c(¸). A positive in ‡ation shock, " t , and a positive temporary demand shock,~t, both motivate an increase in the instrument. Those increases are smaller with a higher weight on output stabilization, since c(¸) is increasing in¸. For an unchanged interest rate, a positive in ‡ation shock and a positive temporary demand shock both increase the one-year and the two-year in ‡ation forecast. The two-year in ‡ation forecast increases more since it is also a¤ected by the fall in the real interest rate, i t ¡ ¼ t+1jt . Since by (19) the two-year in ‡ation forecast should optimally increase less, namely by the fraction c(¸)
of the increase of the one-period forecast, the interest rate should be increased. The higher the fraction c(¸), the less the interest rate needs to be increased.
A shock to the natural output level, » t , motivates a fall in the instrument, which is larger with more persistence,°n, and a lower relative weight on output-gap stabilization,¸. More persistence lowers the output gap further in year one and leads to a larger fall in the two-year in ‡ation forecast which, everything else equal, requires a larger fall in the interest rate. More weight on output-gap stabilization motivates a more modest fall in the interest rate.
A shock to the persistent demand disturbance, ³ t , leads to an increase in the instrument which is independent of the weight on output-gap stabilization. This shock increases output in year one and the two-year in ‡ation forecast, but not the one-year in ‡ation forecast. Stabilizing in ‡ation and stabilizing the output gap both call for an increase in the instrument to cancel the e¤ect of the shock.
The response coe¢cients for the shocks in (20) are, of course, the same coe¢cients as in the reaction function for the more elaborate model in appendix A, (A14).
IV. Model uncertainty
In this section, I consider model uncertainty, in the form of uncertainty about the coe¢cients in the model (1)- (3). Let me simplify the model somewhat by disregarding the exogenous variable (¯x = 0). Restate the model as
where coe¢cients ® y ,~y and¯r have been dated according to the year they refer to. For simplicity, consider only the case of strict in ‡ation targeting (¸= 0) and the simpli…cation of the problem to minimize (6) to the period-by-period problem (see Svensson (1997a) for details for the case when there is no model uncertainty)
and where I use the notatioñ a y;t+1 = ® y;t+1~yt and a r;t+1 = ® y;t+1¯rt
and observe that ¼ t+1jt is predetermined.
Assume …rst that coe¢cients ® yt ,~y t and¯r t remain constant. The …rst-order condition for this problem is then the targeting rule
as we saw in section II. Now, following the classic analysis of Brainard (1967) (the relevance of which has recently been emphasized by Blinder (1995) , see also Chow (1975, chapter 10) ), consider the alternative problem when there is model uncertainty in the form of uncertainty in year t, when the instrument is chosen, about the coe¢cientã y;t+1 and the policy multiplier a r;t+1 , resulting from uncertainty about the coe¢cients ® yt ,~y t and¯r t . More precisely, let ® yt be known at t, and let ® y;t+1 = ® y + º ®y;t+1 yt =~y + º¯y t rt =¯r + º¯r t where º ®y;t+1 , º¯y t and º¯r t are iid stochastic disturbances with zero means and given variances/covariances. The realizations of these disturbances become known in year t + 1. For simplicity, assume that º ®y;t+1 is uncorrelated with º¯y t and º¯r t . Then we can writẽ a y;t+1 =ã y + º y;t+1 a r;t+1 = a r + º r;t+1 ;
where º y;t+1 and º r;t+1 are zero mean iid disturbances, and
Thus, in year t, the parameters in the current Phillips curve are known, but neither those of next year's Phillips curve, nor those of the current aggregate demand equation. These are instead known in year t + 1. That is, we assume that all uncertainty relevant for the policy decision in year t is resolved in year t + 1. In particular, there is a new realization of the stochastic disturbance terms each year, with unchanged variances and covariances. Therefore, no attained knowledge can reduce the uncertainty, and there is no point in experimenting in order to learn more about the stochastic properties of the model. The fact that there is no role for experimentation and learning simpli…es the analysis considerably.
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Under these assumptions, the constraint in year t can be written
where the one-year in ‡ation forecast, ¼ t+1jt , remains predetermined and is given by (23). Let º y;t+1 and º r;t+1 have variances and covariances ¾ 2 y , ¾ 2 r and ¾ yr , respectively. 9 Furthermore, let the covariance of º r;t+1 with ' t+1´"t+1 + ® y;t+1´t+1 be ¾ 'r , but assume that º ®y;t+1 and t+1 are independent so (® y;t+1´t+1 ) jt = E[® y;t+1´t+1 ] = 0: It then follows that the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is given by
With the constraint (27), the …rst-order condition is
8 On learning and experimenting, see, for instance, Chow (1975, chapt. 11 ), Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) , Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and Wieland (1996 Wieland ( , 1998 . 9 If there is uncertainty in ®y;t+1 (or~y t ) alone with variance ¾ We can rewrite the …rst-order condition as
It is clear that with multiplier uncertainty, the variances and covariances of the multiplier will a¤ect the solution and make it deviate from (25). The standard certainty-equivalence in the linear-quadratic model breaks down.
We can discuss the optimal policy either in terms of targeting rules or reaction functions.
Let us …rst look at reaction functions. Using (28) in (29), we can solve for the optimal reaction function,
is the coe¢cient of variation of the policy multiplier a r .
In order to interpret the reaction function (30), consider the special case of "independent multiplier uncertainty", when ¾ 2 r > 0, but º r is not correlated with º y or ', that is, ¾ yr = ¾ 'r = 0. This is the case when there is uncertainty in¯r t alone, and when¯r t is uncorrelated with ' t+1 . Then (30) simpli…es to
We see that more uncertainty (a higher coe¢cient of variation v r ) leads to a more "conservative"
and less activist policy, in the sense of reducing the magnitude of the response coe¢cients.
In order to interpret the policy further, consider two extreme cases. First, consider the case with no (policy) multiplier uncertainty (¾ 2 r = 0), as in section II. Then v r = 0, and the reaction function is
which I call the "no-multiplier-uncertainty" policy.
Next, consider the other extreme, with in…nite uncertainty (¾ 2 r ! 1). The model and its policy are of course meaningless with unbounded uncertainty, so this case only serves as a hypothetical reference point. It follows from (31) that the optimal policy is then to set the interest equal to expected in ‡ation, so as to make the real interest rate equal to its long-run average (here normalized to zero),
I call this the "in…nite-multiplier-uncertainty" policy. Intuitively, with large uncertainty in the coe¢cient¯r t in (22), it is best to choose the instrument so that the real interest rate is close to its long-run average, in order to limit the variability of in ‡ation. For in…nite uncertainty, when the real interest rate is held constant at zero, in ‡ation becomes non-stationary. 10 The reaction function (31) can now be written as a convex combination of the no-multiplieruncertainty reaction function and the in…nite-multiplier-uncertainty reaction function,
Thus, the monetary authority is more conservative with independent multiplier uncertainty than without any multiplier uncertainty, in the sense that its policy is an average of the policy without uncertainty and the policy for in…nite uncertainty (which makes the real interest rate equal to its long-run average).
Next, we shall look at this in terms of targeting rules. The two-year conditional in ‡ation forecasts that correspond to the no-multiplier-uncertainty policy and the in…nite-multiplier-1 0 The appropriate response when uncertainty becomes very high is of course dependent on the precise model and nature of the uncertainty. From (21) and (22), it is apparent that if the uncertainty is in ®yt or~y t rather than in¯r t , the appropriate response with in…nite uncertainty is to set the instrument such that y t+1jt = 0, rather than it ¡ ¼ t+1jt = 0. uncertainty policy are ¼ t+2jt
respectively. Since the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is linear in the instrument, it follows that it will be a convex combination of the long-run in ‡ation target and the in…nite-multiplier-uncertainty two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast with the same weight as in (34),
Thus, the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast deviates from the in ‡ation target by a fraction vr 1+vr of the deviation of the in…nite-multiplier-uncertainty two-year in ‡ation forecast from the in ‡ation target. Equivalently, the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast deviates from the in ‡ation target by the sum of the same fraction of the deviation of the one-year in ‡ation forecast from the in ‡ation target and a term proportional to the output gap. In the case of ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is only gradually adjusted towards the in ‡ation target.
In the general case, when multiplier uncertainty is not independent, the policy (30) involves a constant, ¾ 'r =a r (1+vr)ar . The coe¢cient of y t is also modi…ed, and a¤ected by the covariance ¾ yr .
The constant will make average in ‡ation deviate from the long-run in ‡ation target. The long-run average follows directly from (29) and ful…lls
where I have used that E [y t ] = 0 and
. Thus, the average in ‡ation deviates from the in ‡ation target, the bias being positive or negative depending on the sign of the covariance between the policy multiplier and the disturbance to in ‡ation, ¾ 'r . The two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast will be
The two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is mean-reverting and gradually adjusted towards (35).
In summary, model uncertainty in the form of policy-multiplier uncertainty motivates deviations from the long-run in ‡ation target. Under strict in ‡ation targeting, without any multiplier uncertainty, the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast should always equal the long-run in ‡ation target. With independent policy-multiplier uncertainty, the optimal policy is a convex combination of the no-multiplier-uncertainty policy and the in…nite-multiplier-uncertainty policy, which results in the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast being gradually adjusted towards the longrun in ‡ation target. When policy-multiplier uncertainty is not independent, there may be a bias in average in ‡ation, and the response of the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast to the output gap is modi…ed.
These results are derived under the assumption that parameters are stochastic with a known stationary distribution, so there is no scope for learning and experimentation. Even in that case, for particular covariance patterns for the disturbances to the di¤erent parameters, the policy caution can be overturned and a more aggressive policy can be optimal (for instance, if the covariance ¾ yr in (36) is negative). If the uncertainty is instead due to the central bank having an imperfect knowledge of the true parameters, the problem is very di¤erent. As examined in Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) and Wieland (1996 Wieland ( , 1998 ), the central bank may then have an incentive to experiment and, in the short run, pursue a policy that generates more informative data, in order to achieve a better policy in the long run. The variance and covariance of para-meters are then endogenous; not exogenous as in the Brainard case. The optimal response often seems to be a compromise between the certainty-equivalent policy in the absence of parameter uncertainty and the cautious Brainard policy.
V. Interest rate stabilization and smoothing
How is in ‡ation targeting a¤ected by attempts to stabilize and/or smooth the instrument? 11
Modify the period loss function to
This allows for a weight ¹¸0 on stabilizing the pseudo-real rate, i t ¡¼ t , as well as a weight º¸0
on smoothing the instrument (stabilizing the …rst-di¤erence of the instrument). Alternatives to stabilizing the pseudo-real rate are, of course, to stabilize the real interest rate, i t ¡ ¼ t+1jt , or the nominal interest rate i t itself. Since other variables than in ‡ation enters the loss function, this is another case of ‡exible in ‡ation targeting.
Minimizing the intertemporal loss function (6) with the period loss function (7) replaced by (37 ) generally seems to require a numerical solution of the standard linear-quadratic optimal control problem. In particular, when º > 0, the lagged instrument enters as a state variable, which together with in ‡ation and the output gap brings the number of state variables up to three (excluding the exogenous variable).
In order to gain some insight into the e¤ects of interest rate stabilization and smoothing, without having to resort to numerical analysis, let me make a few simpli…cations. First, the weight on output stabilization is set to zero. Second, each period the monetary authority solves the simple problem
1 1 See Goodhart (1996) for a recent discussion of interest rate smoothing. subject to
where I use (9), (10) and (16), and for simplicity disregard the exogenous variable (a x =¯x = 0).
The monetary authority is assumed to minimize the loss function in (38) each period, taking last year's interest rate as given, but disregarding that today's instrument setting will a¤ect next year's loss function. When¸= ¹ = º = 0, this problem is equivalent to the general intertemporal problem, as demonstrated in Svensson (1997a) . When either ¹ or º di¤ers from zero, this is no longer true. Nevertheless, the simple case of (38) helps to understand the general consequences of instrument stabilization and smoothing.
The …rst-order condition is
We can write the …rst-order condition as
and observe that when ¹ or º di¤er from zero, the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast will generally deviate from the in ‡ation target.
We can solve for the reaction function and get
With a zero weight on instrument smoothing (º = 0), the reaction function does not depend on the lagged interest rate and is given by
Hence, the e¤ect of a positive weight on (pseudo-real) interest rate stabilization is simply to reduce the coe¢cients of ¼ t ¡ ¼ ¤ and y t .
the lagged interest rate and becomes
Note that the reaction function is not simply a rule for the …rst-di¤erence of the instrument.
In this simple case, the reaction function has an interesting interpretation. Let i ¼ t denote the reaction function under strict in ‡ation targeting, when ¹ = º = 0. It is given by
Furthermore, let i i t and i ¢i t denote the reaction functions under strict pseudo-real interest rate stabilization (¹ ! 1, º = 0) and strict interest rate smoothing (º ! 1, ¹ = 0), respectively. These are given by i i t = ¼ t and i ¢i t = i t¡1. Then, the optimal reaction function can be written as a convex combination of the three rules,
Let ¼ j t+2jt , j = ¼, i, ¢i, denote the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast that corresponds to each strict rule. They are given by
where I use that by (10) and (26) a y = ® y +ã y : It follows that the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is the same convex combination of these three forecasts,
Equations (43)- (44) can be interpreted as equivalent forms of a targeting rule for the twoyear conditional in ‡ation forecast, implying that the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast is gradually adjusted to the in ‡ation target.
Generally, concerns about interest stabilization and smoothening leads to a less active policy. The two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast, as for ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, is adjusted gradually towards the in ‡ation target. Numerical analysis of the general intertemporal problem con…rms this insight.
As far as I can see, the result that a reaction function can be written as a convex combination of strict reaction functions does not necessarily hold in the general intertemporal problem. In some special cases the result holds, but it is more complicated to determine the weights.
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VI. Conclusions
In ‡ation targeting makes the conditional in ‡ation forecast (conditional upon the current state of the economy and the current instrument setting) an intermediate target. Under strict in ‡ation targeting, the targeting rule is very simple. The instrument should be adjusted such that the conditional in ‡ation forecast for a horizon corresponding to the control lag always equals the in ‡ation target. Any shock causing a deviation between the conditional in ‡ation forecast and the in ‡ation target should then be met by an instrument adjustment that eliminates the deviation.
Under ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, the targeting rule is not quite as simple, but very intuitive. The instrument should be adjusted such that the conditional in ‡ation forecast gradually approaches the long-run in ‡ation target. For instance, when there is some weight on output stabilization in the monetary authority's loss function, the two-year conditional in ‡ation forecast's deviation from the long-run in ‡ation target should be a given proportion of the predetermined one-year in ‡ation forecast's deviation from the same target. When there is some weight on instrument stabilization or smoothing, on the other hand, the conditional forecast should also be gradually adjusted towards the long-run in ‡ation target. As a consequence, there is a more gradual response to shocks. The intuition for this result is, of course, that a more gradual adjustment requires less output and instrument variability.
Interestingly, a gradual adjustment of the conditional in ‡ation forecast towards the longrun in ‡ation target is also the appropriate policy under model uncertainty. Here, the intuition is that uncertainty about the policy multiplier requires a more muted instrument response, in order to reduce the part of the variability in in ‡ation caused by the variability of the policy multiplier.
Thus, both ‡exible in ‡ation targeting and model uncertainty lead to a gradual adjustment of the conditional in ‡ation forecast toward the long-run in ‡ation target. Since they have similar observation-equivalent consequences the precise reasons for these are not directly revealed by observations of gradual adjustment to the long-run in ‡ation target. In this context, it is interesting to note that the 0-2 percent per year range for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was increased to 0-3 percent per year in the modi…cation of the Policy Target Agreement in December 1996. In the debate in New Zealand, some observers have suggested that the original target range requires an excessive degree of activism on the part of the Reserve Bank, and that a slightly wider band would be desirable (Brash (1997) ).
Many in ‡ation-targeting issues remain and seem suitable for future research. The model used here is annual, and it remains to apply these ideas in a quarterly, more empirical framework. Rudebusch and Svensson (1997) compare di¤erent in ‡ation targeting rules and instrument rules, for instance the Taylor rule, in an empirical quarterly model for the United States.
The model is simpli…ed by assuming that there is a one-year control lag for output and a two-year control lag for in ‡ation. Furthermore, the impact at the control lag (the shortest horizon at which the instrument has an e¤ect) is substantial. In a more elaborate model with shorter periods and empirically estimated coe¢cients, the …rst e¤ect of the instrument on output and in ‡ation may be quite small, with the e¤ect growing to a maximum several periods later and then declining. For strict in ‡ation targeting, the …rst e¤ect is still the relevant one, and the task of monetary policy is then to ful…ll the in ‡ation target at the shortest possible horizon.
That …rst e¤ect being quite small, drastic adjustments of the instrument will be required, thus making strict in ‡ation even less attractive. For ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, the question arises which horizon should be emphasized by the central bank, both in its internal policy decisions and in its communications with the private sector. Some central banks have chosen to emphasize the horizon at which the e¤ect is largest (this horizon is often assumed to be about two years).
Generally, in a more elaborate model the whole time path of the in ‡ation forecast is of relevance, and the criterion whether policy is optimal is whether the forecasts of in ‡ation and the output gap "look right," more speci…cally, whether they approach the in ‡ation target and zero, respectively, at an appropriate pace. Svensson (1998b) gives examples of optimal time-paths of these forecasts for di¤erent disturbances and weights in the loss function for an open economy with forward-looking aggregate demand and supply. Svensson (1998a) provides a more general discussion of the roles of targeting rules and rules of thumb in in ‡ation targeting. More research on these issues would be desirable.
In ‡ation-targeting with imperfectly observed shocks results in a signal-extraction problem for the monetary authority. Imperfect identi…cation of shocks may be a separate reason for a gradual adjustment of the conditional in ‡ation forecast toward the long-run in ‡ation target, which remains to be examined. In an open economy, there is also a choice between targeting in ‡ation in domestic prices only (the GDP de ‡ator) or a consumer price index where imports enter. These and other issues in open-economy in ‡ation targeting are examined in Svensson (1998b) .
The model used here has backward-looking aggregate demand and supply with considerable inertia. More forward-looking aggregate demand and supply in principle reduces the inertia and makes it easier to ful…ll the in ‡ation target, as long as the in ‡ation target is credible. If the in ‡ation target is not credible, its forward-looking aspects may possibly make the in ‡ation target
The one-year and two-year in ‡ation forecasts are
¼ t+2jt (i t ) = ¼ t + a y y t + a z z t + a n y n t ¡ a r (i t ¡ ¼ t );
where a y = ® y (1 +¯y) (A10) a z = ® y¯z (A11) a n = ® y¯n (A12)
With the period loss function (7), the optimal policy rule can be written on the forms
where f ¼ (¸) and f y (¸) are given by (15), f z =¯z r and f n =¯n r .
In (3), x t represents either the persistent demand disturbance z t or the natural rate y n t (or both, if it is interpreted as a vector and°as a diagonal matrix).
